under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) §2. 7 Third, the SEC has never repudiated its staff position that an arbitration provision in a publicly traded issuer"s governance documents would violate Securities Act §14 8 and Securities Exchange Act §29(a), 9 the anti-waiver provisions.
10
In addition to these legal obstacles, publicly traded issuers may not have perceived significant advantages to arbitration. Indeed, with respect to high-stakes "bet the company" disputes, such as securities class actions, litigation may be preferable because the very narrow grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards may make the risk of an aberrational arbitration award unacceptably high. 11 In addition, specifically with respect to federal securities claims, PSLRA imposes significant obstacles on plaintiffs in order to achieve the statute"s twin goals of "curb[ing] frivolous, lawyerdriven litigation, while preserving investors" ability to recover on meritorious claims."
12
As a result, it was hard to see how relocating federal securities fraud claims to a more flexible, less law-oriented arbitration forum would provide any advantages to corporate defendants. Finally, issuers could expect that adoption of an arbitration provision would expose them to criticism from investor advocates and negative publicity. 13 Taking into account all these factors, an issuer and its counsel were, at least until recently, likely to conclude that the costs of attempting to adopt an arbitration provision outweighed any 7 See infra notes and accompanying text. 8 15 U.S.C. § 77n. 9 15 U.S.C. § 78cc. 10 See infra notes and accompanying text. 11 See infra notes and accompanying text. 12 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 309 (1997). 13 Shearson was generally viewed as an anti-investor decision, and investors' advocates urged Congress to enact legislation to overturn the result. likely benefits. Accordingly, few publicly traded domestic issuers took the bold step of adopting arbitration provisions in their governance documents.
Recent legal developments, however, make inclusion of an arbitration provision in a publicly traded issuer"s governance documents a proposal worthy of serious consideration. First, while there continues to be legal uncertainty about the legality and enforceability of arbitration provisions contained in corporate governance documents, a recent Delaware Chancery Court opinion suggests that certificates of incorporation of publicly traded Delaware corporations could include arbitration clauses that would bind shareholders at least with respect to state fiduciary duty claims.
14 Second, it is possible that if Delaware courts find an arbitration provision unenforceable, other courts could find the provision enforceable under the FAA, which would preempt the state law. 15 Third, the SEC may find it difficult to maintain its opposition to arbitration provisions in governance documents in light of the fact that a number of foreign private issuers whose securities are traded in the U.S. have such provisions in their governance documents. 16 Finally, the Supreme Court recently upheld, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 17 a provision in a consumer contract that disallowed class arbitration because the FAA preempted California precedent striking down class arbitration waivers as unconscionable. 18 In light of Concepcion, issuers may be able to achieve an advantage through adoption of an arbitration provision in their governance documents that they
were not able to achieve through PSLRA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. 19 They could finally achieve the demise of securities class claims! Part II discusses the erosion of the legal obstacles that discouraged publicly traded issuers from adopting arbitration provisions in governance documents. Part III compares litigation and arbitration options from the perspective of corporate defendants and shows that, at least until recently, they were likely to prefer litigation. Part IV addresses the U.S. Supreme Court"s recent decisions on class arbitration and, in particular, the "gamechanger," Concepcion. 20 Part V considers the implications of Concepcion and the impact on investors if class actions against publicly traded issuers are eliminated. Part VI concludes.
II. Legal Obstacles Are Eroding

A. Legality and Enforceability under State Corporate Law
There is considerable uncertainty under state corporate law 21 about the legality and enforceability of arbitration provisions contained in a publicly traded issuer"s governance documents. 22 While modern corporation statutes allow great flexibility and private ordering, the discretion of corporate managers and shareholders to limit shareholders" powers cannot "achieve a result forbidden by settled rules of public containing an arbitration provision by including it, for example, in the proxy statement for the annual meeting of shareholders, and it can be argued that shareholders that continue to hold their shares after receiving the notice would be bound by the arbitration provision. 57 The countervailing argument, that merely continuing to hold the shares after receiving notice is not the manifestation of assent required under contract law, is also supportable.
58
State corporate law frequently refers to a corporation"s governance documents as a contract with the state 59 and with the shareholders. 60 An issue rarely addressed in the case law is whether this judicial notion of a contract in the context of resolving corporate governance issues, should be deemed the equivalent of a commercial contract under FAA § 2. Arbitration of shareholders" disputes in closely held corporations has long been generally accepted, 61 but, while the arbitration provision may also be included in the governance documents, the arbitration clause is typically found in an actual agreement entered into by all the shareholders. 62 A recent Third Circuit opinion, applying Pennsylvania law, refused to enforce an arbitration provision contained in the bylaws of a professional corporation (a law firm) against a lawyer-shareholder in the absence of 57 Support for the argument that notice on the corporation"s website is sufficient can be found in the auction cases where because of the special nature of auctions, the law imposes a greater responsibility on bidders to ascertain the terms of the sale; evidence that she assented to it. 63 The plaintiff specifically averred that she was never provided a copy of the bylaws, was never informed of the existence of the arbitration provision in the bylaws, and never signed any document that referred to the arbitration provision. To counter this, the law firm argued that as a director, she had constructive notice of the terms of the bylaws, but the court was not persuaded. After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to address the "tension between corporate law principles and arbitration contract principles," 64 the Third Circuit determined that because the plaintiff did not receive a copy of the bylaws containing the arbitration provision, she
could not have agreed to arbitrate. Note that the Third Circuit stated that there cannot be assent to arbitration without receipt of the arbitration agreement; it does not state that receipt of the arbitration provision, without more, would constitute the requisite manifestation of assent. 65 If an affirmative act of acceptance is required, possibly a shareholders" vote on the management proxy card would suffice, although there remains the issue of whether non-assenting shareholders would be bound.
66
The uncertainty under both state corporate and contract law could lead to different outcomes in different jurisdictions. Indeed, it could lead to an unprecedented show-down between the current Supreme Court, which is generally considered to be "pro-business," and the Delaware judiciary, which is widely praised for its business acumen. Moreover, 66 Galaviz v. Berg, discussed supra note and accompanying text, also recognized the tension between corporate and contract law principles when it found no mutual assent , at least with respect to preexisting shareholders, when a forum selection bylaw was adopted by directors, but stated that the argument for treating it like a commercial contract would be stronger if it had been adopted by a majority vote of the shareholders.
even if the arbitration provision is determined to be legal and enforceable under corporate or contract law, the legal battle may not be over for a publicly traded issuer wishing to adopt such a provision. Federal courts may determine that the arbitration provision is invalid, with respect to federal securities claims, because it violates the anti-waiver provisions of the federal securities laws. We turn next to this issue.
C. SEC Staff's Position on Arbitration Provisions in Governance Documents
Securities Act § 14 67 and Securities Exchange Act § 29(a) 68 (the anti-waiver statutes) invalidate "any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with" the federal securities statutes and their rules.
69
In 1990, when a corporation that was planning its initial public offering sought to include an arbitration provision in its governance documents, the SEC staff objected to its inclusion. 70 In its view, "it would be contrary to the public interest to require investors who want to participate in the nation"s equity markets to waive access to a judicial forum for vindication of federal or state law rights, where such a waiver is made through a corporate charter rather than through an individual investor"s decision." were not persuaded that there would be significant benefits to outweigh the considerable costs. Part III examines the arbitration and litigation options from the perspective of a corporate defendant to show that, at least until recently, litigation, and not arbitration, would be the preferred option.
III. Comparing Arbitration and Litigation: "High Stakes" Claims
From the perspective of a publicly traded issuer contemplating amendment of its governance documents to require arbitration of investors" claims, the cost-benefit analysis of arbitration versus litigation is complex. 83 Adopting an arbitration provision would certainly entail significant initial costs. Because litigation is the default rule and arbitration in this context is not customary, transaction costs would be incurred in drafting the arbitration provision, amending the corporate governance documents, and in all likelihood litigating challenges to the provision, at least until the issues of legality and enforceability were resolved. Adopting an arbitration clause may also cost a corporate defendant in terms of reputation and bad publicity, given a strong belief among many investors and their advocates that arbitration is unfair and biased toward businesses that are "repeat players." 84 The corporation may also experience a negative reaction from the SEC staff that could affect subsequent dealings with the agency. After the initial costs, arbitration entails some expenditures for the arbitration panel and forum that are not incurred in litigation. 85 In the context of securities class actions and derivative claims, however, where other costs (principally, lawyers" and experts" fees) are high, these costs 83 clause in a shipping charter to permit class arbitration as a matter of public policy. 108 The parties stipulated that the arbitration clause was silent with respect to class arbitration and that "[a]ll the parties agree that when a contract is silent on an issue there"s been no agreement that has been reached on that issue. Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York law contains a "default rule" under which an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class arbitration in the absence of express consent, the panel proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied in such a situation. Perceiving a post-Bazzle consensus among arbitrators that class arbitration is beneficial in "a wide variety of settings," the panel considered only whether there was any good reason not to follow that consensus in this case. …. The conclusion is inescapable that the panel simply imposed its own conception of sound policy. . 108 The three dissenting Justices (Ginsburg, Stevens and Breyer) argued that the issue was not ripe for judicial review, since this was a "partial award" that ruled only that the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. Id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 109 Id. at 1766. 110 Id. 111 Id. at 1768-69.
The majority, moreover, did more than vacate the award; rather than remand to the arbitration panel, it went on to construe the arbitration clause as not permitting class arbitrations. Recognizing that this action appeared at variance with Bazzle, the majority took pains to narrow the import of that previous decision. Emphasizing repeatedly that the rationale of Justice Breyer"s opinion did not constitute the views of a majority of Justices, 112 Justice Alito described Bazzle"s plurality opinion as addressing only one narrow question: that the arbitrators, and not the court, should decide whether a contract is "silent" on the question of class arbitration. 113 It did not, according to Justice Alito, address the standard for determining whether an arbitration agreement allows class arbitration.
114
In this discussion, Justice Alito raises the question of whether the permissibility of class arbitrations is more than a question of contract interpretation: 113 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772 ("Unfortunately, the opinions in Bazzle appear to have baffled the parties in this case at the time of the arbitration proceeding. For one thing, the parties appear to have believed that the judgment in Bazzle requires an arbitrator, not a court, to decide whether a contract permits class arbitration. . . . In fact, however, only the plurality decided that question. But we need not revisit that question here because the parties" supplemental agreement expressly assigned this issue to the arbitration panel, and no party argues that this assignment was impermissible.") 114 Id. ("Unfortunately, however, both the parties and the arbitration panel seem to have misunderstood Bazzle in another respect, namely, that it established the standard to be applied by a decision maker in determining whether a contract may permissibly be interpreted to allow class arbitration.") 115 Id. at 1771.
term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties" agreement to arbitrate."
116
In Stolt-Nielsen, the majority of the Court signaled that Bazzle should no longer be read to encourage class arbitrations. 117 In addition, the Court"s majority opinion, in arriving at its conclusion that parties must agree specifically to class arbitration, emphasized the fundamental differences between traditional arbitration and class arbitration. Thus, the majority reminded us, the typical arbitration is a relatively simple proceeding. Even when the subject matter of the dispute is complex, the task of the arbitrator is to resolve a single dispute that adjudicates the rights of a few identified parties who appear before the forum. In contrast, in a class arbitration, there is additional complexity because the arbitrator seeks to resolve many disputes that involve the adjudication of the rights of numerous parties, most of whom are absent from the proceeding. The Court made this point most explicitly when it compared and contrasted class arbitration and class action litigation: "the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation, … even though the scope of judicial review is much more limited…." 118 In short, there should be certainty that parties have agreed to a method of dispute resolution that appears ill-suited to their needs.
119
In addition, the Court highlighted two important issues that call into question the appropriateness of a private contractual justice system: protecting the interests of absent parties and providing meaningful review of an arbitration award that has significant consequences for the parties, including absent class members. As did Justice Alito in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Scalia enumerated the differences between bilateral and class arbitration to support his conclusion that "class arbitration, to the Although Concepcion considered class action waivers in the context of consumer arbitration contracts, the majority"s opinion does not suggest any inclination to limit its holding to that category of contract. Accordingly, Concepcion provides an incentive for publicly traded issuers that wish to eliminate securities class actions seriously to consider amending their governance documents to include an arbitration provision with a class action waiver.
V. Legality of Class Action Waivers in Securities Class Actions
Suppose a publicly traded domestic issuer adopts an arbitration provision with a class action waiver. A class action waiver with respect to securities class actions raises two additional possible challenges to its validity: (1) 149 The high costs of pursuing federal securities claims means that, unless a classwide remedy is available, there is, as a practical matter, no remedy for investors with small holdings. A class action waiver in this context is the equivalent of a waiver of investor protections prohibited by the anti-waiver provisions.
To counter this argument, opponents of the federal securities class actions assert that they serve poorly the compensatory function and therefore the individual investors would not lose anything of significance. 150 Moreover, in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 151 the Court suggested that it agreed with business interests that the power of regulators to recover funds for the compensation of fraud victims provided an adequate opportunity for compensation. To the extent that courts doubt the compensatory function of class actions, the policy argument based on the antiwaiver provisions is less compelling.
Ironically, the best argument for those advocating the importance of the federal securities class action is the PSLRA, legislation that came about largely through the lobbying efforts of the business community. Business interests urged Congress to eliminate the FOTM presumption, without which securities fraud class actions would be difficult if not impossible to maintain. 152 Instead, PSLRA sought to week out frivolous suits through a variety of procedural and other measures. 153 In choosing to cure, but not to eliminate the securities class action, Congress determined that a collective-action remedy is necessary for investor protection, especially retail investors. In the PSLRA Congress thus confirmed the importance of the federal securities class action to the integrity of the U.S. capital markets.
154
VI. Conclusion
As this article has explained, post-Concepcion, publicly traded domestic issuers have good reason to consider seriously adoption of an arbitration provision, with a class-action waiver, in their governance documents. While there is considerable uncertainty about the legality and enforceability of such a provision, an issuer may well consider the potential benefits worth fighting for.
What are the implications if issuers prove successful in replacing securities class actions with individual arbitrations? It is worth remembering that there is a fundamental difference between arbitration and litigation. Arbitration is a contractual private system of justice, where the arbitrators are selected by the parties for the sole purpose of deciding the dispute before them. Their charge is to meet their contractual responsibilities to the parties. 155 Litigation, in contrast, takes place in a government forum, before government officials with a responsibility to look out for the public interest. Securities class actions, in particular, are paradigms of complex civil litigation where the structure and formality of a judicial proceeding are important. Judges" responsibilities include managing the litigation, including, in the case of class actions, looking out for the interests of absent class members, coordinating with related proceedings in other jurisdictions, 156 conducting the proceedings in an open forum, 157 and reviewing settlements to assure they are in the public interest and protect absent class members. 158 Another important responsibility of the judiciary is to interpret law and to develop principles, such as fiduciary duty and investor protection principles, that will set standards for appropriate conduct on the part of corporate managers and deter inappropriate conduct. 159 In addition, with respect to federal securities class actions, the significant procedural advantages under PSLRA that Congress constructed for defendants, in order to achieve the twin goals "to curb frivolous, lawyer-driven litigation while preserving investors" ability to recover on meritorious claims," 160 are not readily transferable to the arbitration forum. 161 In securities class actions, there is a need for formality and transparency in order to meet the goals of the participants and the national interest.
Adjudications, unlike arbitrations, fulfill functions of deterrence and development of legal standards and satisfy investors" right to know the laws are being enforced.
Accordingly, the enforceability of an arbitration provision in governance documents, although raising interesting and complex legal questions, is really the secondary issue. The overarching policy issue is the future of the securities class actions.
Respected academics have previously called for the SEC to take an active role in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the federal securities class action. 162 There have been similar calls for reform of state securities class actions. 163 Currently there are numerous securities class actions working their way through the judicial system in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. 164 In short, the time is right for a re-examination of the
